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SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT DEVELOPING CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACHES TO LAWYER AND LAW STUDENT DISTRESS
PETER G. GLENN1
What should we do about it? What, realistically, can we do about it? The
study by Beck et al.2 (Beck study) contains no late-breaking news. We have
known for many years that some law students and practicing lawyers report
high levels of distress. Lawyers are said to be disproportionately at risk for
problems related to alcohol. Reports of lawyer unhappiness and of lawyers
leaving the profession have been widely noted.3 We also know that depression,
fatigue, 'burnout," and substance abuse can, and more than occasionally do,
adversely affect the quality of services to clients.
Although the Beck study offers little that is truly new, and although at times
its tone may be slightly hysterical, we should not ignore its message. We should
search for constructive ways to reduce the incidence of lawyer and law student
distress, because lawyer distress can result in harm to clients and because we
have a responsibility to care for our fellow professionals. Developing
constructive responses to problems of lawyer distress is quite difficult. We do
not have a clear sense of either the actual dimensions or the actual effects of the
problems. Moreover there are effective responses to some characteristics of
both law practice and law schools that are obstacles to lawyer and law student
distress.
I am not qualified to judge the Beck study as research in terms of technical,
social science methodology. I do, however, advance some cautionary
comments related to the study:
First, we should remind ourselves of the limitations of self-report survey
data. This is especially so when the subjects making the reports are lawyers and
law students who have been told repeatedly that they ought to be distressed,
and for whom a part of their occupational cultures is the idea that one cannot
be much of a law student or lawyer unless one is working very hard, under
considerable time pressure, and in circumstances in which the risk of failure is
reasonably high. Thus, I am not surprised that in this population there is
self-reported distress.
The important question, which I do not understand the Beck study to even
purport to answer, is the extent to which the reported distress of law students
1Dean and Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law.
2 Connie J.A. Beck, et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1996).
3The Report of At the Breaking Point, a National Conference on the Emerging Crisis
in the Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client
Services, American Bar Association (1991), [hereinafter "At the Breaking Point".]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
and lawyers results in behavior that is harmful to self or others. My hypothesis
is that the level of self-reported distress is likely to be higher than the actual
incidence of self or socially harmful behavior resulting from stress of the types
reported. Without knowing whether the self-reported personal distress has
resulted in harmful behaviors and, if so, without knowing something about the
incidence and seriousness of those behaviors, it is difficult to conclude that even
very high levels of some types of self-reported distress warrant aggressive
intervention.
The Beck study recognizes that it has not succeeded in usefully measuring
the behavioral effects of self-reported distress and that "further research,
conducted with even better instruments, may still find that lawyers are
functioning at a high level of efficiency and ethical propriety despite high levels
of psychological distress and alcohol-related problems."4 While I doubt that an
appropriate study could fail to show some correlation between very high levels
of personal distress and ineffective professional performance, we don't now
know enough to make a carefully considered judgment about the actual-as
opposed to possible-impact of lawyer distress on lawyer health or job
performance. Therefore we cannot ascertain the extent to which systemic
change is necessary. We should remember that practicing law is inherently a
difficult, stressful and demanding occupation. It is likely that very few lawyers
would fail to report some levels of discomfort during at least some times in
their careers.
My second cautionary comment about the Beck study is that we lack
comparisons of self-reported lawyer distress levels with similar reports by
members of truly analogous professions. I am not persuaded that the legal and
medical professions are sufficiently analogous to make comparisons of levels
of distress as between lawyers and physicians useful as a basis for prescriptions
for the legal profession. While I recognize that some such comparative studies
have been performed,5 my hypothesis is that with the exception of some
surgical specialists, emergency medicine specialists, and young residents
undergoing the medical profession's barbaric trial by fatigue, most physicians
have more control of their time, of the content and nature of their work, and of
their patients than do most of their counterparts in the legal profession. This is
not to say that being a physician is easy or free from stress, but only that being
a conscientious lawyer is a very demanding and very stressful occupation in
ways that are not analogous to the stresses of most medical practices 6.
I would be interested in knowing how the levels of self- reported personal
distress in lawyer populations compare with levels of self-reported personal
4 Beck et al., supra note 2, at 60.
5 E.g., Marilyn Heins, et al., Law Students and Medical Students: a Comparison of
Perceived Stress, 33 J. LEG. EDUc. 511 (1983).
61 do not ignore the fact that, in recent years, economic and structural issues related
to the delivery of health care have made the professional lives of physicians more
stressful and, in many instances, less attractive and that some similar economic and
structural challenges also face the legal profession.
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distress among such people as law enforcement officers, investment bankers,
professional athletes, clergy, politicians, or chief executives of business
enterprises, as well as physicians. If the lawyers' levels of personal distress were
considerably higher than the levels for these other occupational groups, I
would be interested in further exploration of whether being a lawyer is
inherently so stressful that we should radically redesign the profession by
changing our expectations of lawyers.7
We ask a great deal of our lawyers. Lawyering is hard work, performed
before an often unappreciative audience, requiring great attention to detail and
requiring that some degree of sense be made out of muddled and even chaotic
personal or business situations. And this work often must be performed in
circumstances in which the applicable law is less than clear. Moreover, lawyers
function as agents, in relationships in which the client/principal's decisions
about the ends to be attained will control and where, even as to means, the
lawyer/agent does not enjoy complete hegemony. Lawyers often act under
terrible time pressures, often deal with unreasonable clients, nasty opponents,
and indifferent bureaucrats. They work in a professional culture in which they
are told that loyalty to clients is the highest value but that they also are officers
of the court with commensurate responsibilities to society and third parties.
Very often the lawyer's personal and economic needs conflict with the needs
of their clients. Trial lawyers, litigators, and even transactional lawyers often
operate in combative or potentially combative settings in which, according to
the ideology of the profession, they are expected to zealously champion causes
of their clients for which they may have little personal sympathy.
It is the client's cause, the client's interests, and the client's objectives that the
lawyer is bound to advance and protect. Under the current economic realities,
and under our current conceptions of lawyering, many lawyers realistically
have little opportunity to meaningfully deliberate with the client in
establishing the client's goals or objectives. Yale Law School dean Anthony
Kronman recently wrote that "[tihe most demanding and also most rewarding
function that lawyers perform is to help their clients decide what it is they really
want, to help them make up their minds as to what their ends should be, a
function that differs importantly from the instrumental servicing of
preestablished goals.'8 However attractive this conception of lawyering might
be, I suggest (as does Dean Kronman) that in too many instances this ideal is
unattainable in contemporary law practice. We teach, perhaps too much, that
lawyers should respect their clients' autonomy and that lawyers should protect
their clients' rights to determine their own objectives. Parentalism is "out."
Client autonomy and self-actualization are "in" not merely as matters of the
ethics of lawyering but also as a practical result of the economic nature of the
7I recognize, of course, that Beck et al. did not intend to explore hypotheses such as
these, and that Beck et al. are careful not to claim for their study any more than their
data will support.
8ANTHoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 288 (1993).
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attorney-client relationship. We should not lose sight of the fact that there is a
relationship between a high degree of client autonomy and the extent to which
the lawyer becomes a mere instrument of the client-a "hired gun." Thus
lawyers, who generally speaking are smart, savvy, knowledgeable and
thoughtful people, can become objectified in relation to their clients.
Service as such an agent is difficult. Service as such an agent with a
responsibility to apply uncertain rules of law to often elusive facts is even more
difficult. This is tough work. Are we really surprised that some people who do
this work are obsessive-compulsive or slightly paranoid, or overly hostile and
aggressive, or sometimes stressed nearly to the point of paralysis?
It is not surprising that there is measurable distress among lawyers. But in
view of what we ask of our lawyers, it is, I think, a cause for celebration that so
many lawyers perform so well for so long, that so many lawyers take pleasure
and pride in their work, and that so many of them are good companions, good
friends, good parents, good spouses and effective community leaders. Such
celebration, of course, does not mean that we should ignore signs of lawyer
distress. But it does mean that as we define the nature of the problem to which
solutions should be devised, we should realistically assess what we want our
lawyers to do and we should realistically determine what types of personal and
intellectual characteristics we need in our lawyers. Perhaps we want our tax
lawyers to be more than a little obsessive-compulsive. Perhaps we want our
trial lawyers to be more than a little aggressive, or even hostile. In other words,
perhaps we want, and even need, a profession in which at least some
practitioners exhibit characteristics that are not within "normal" ranges.
But even if some of our profession's measurable distress is appropriate and
perhaps even desirable, we are not excused from seriously considering whether
some of that distress can be ameliorated. Is the observed and reported distress
an inevitable product of doing a tough job well, or is it evidence of systemic
weaknesses in the ways people decide to become lawyers, are educated as
lawyers, and in the ways they practice law? I suggest, without fully exploring,
three of many ways in which we might constructively address problems of
lawyer distress:
First, I think it might be useful for our profession to expand the scope of our
inquiries as we develop norms for professional conduct. As we think about
questions of professional ethics we most often think about "rights" and "duties."
We use tools of our profession to carefully consider questions of lawyers' duties
and clients' rights. We do not, however, often consciously consider the
emotional or psychological effects of lawyer adherence to the resulting norms.
Do we really know, or have we carefully thought about, the effects on lawyers
themselves of rules of professional conduct instructing lawyers to exercise
discretion with respect to the most problematic situations as, for example, the
keeping of some client confidences, or in evaluating some types of conflict of
interest situations? Do we really want to emphasize, to the extent we do, the
value of client autonomy? Do our professional norms themselves lead us away
form the model of meaningful deliberation described by Dean Kronman? I do
not here suggest fully developed answers to these questions but observe only
that grappling with questions such as these is not irrelevant to the challenge of
addressing issues of lawyer distress.
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Second, I suggest that we take seriously the recommendation of many
practicing lawyers that we give significant attention-even in the academy-to
questions of law practice management.9 Most lawyers practice, at least some
of the time, in groups. "Teams" of lawyers often address client matters. This
means that for the individual lawyer there not only is a lawyer-client
relationship but also several lawyer-colleague relationships, often hierarchical,
sometimes complex and sometimes even competitive. I suggest that we have
not done much more in our thinking and writing about the profession than to
scratch the surface of an understanding of these collegial relationships. We
have done little more than observe that many lawyers are not effective
managers of work and that more attention should be paid to techniques of
delegation, supervision, communication, feedback and training. My hunch,
based on considerable experience in such group practice, is that ineffective
collegial relationships are a cause of a significant portion of the reported lawyer
distress. And this, I suspect, is a matter as to which we lawyers cannot heal
ourselves. We need to seek insights and guidance from other disciplines if we
are to improve this aspect of our professional lives.
Finally, I suggest we heed the suggestion of Lawrence Fox, one of the most
thoughtful leaders of the bar, that we adopt as one of our primary values the
idea that we should "take care of each other" not only by means of formal lawyer
assistance programs but, more importantly, in our day-to-day interactions with
colleagues and even with our opponents. 10 We are, in many respects, a highly
individualistic and competitive profession. But without compromising
legitimate client interests, we can not only act with mere civility, we also can
be truly caring in our relationships with other lawyers.
Attention to these approaches to the problems can begin in the law schools.
There is no inherent reason why the agenda of scholarship and teaching in the
law schools cannot include substantial inquiry into the nature of the actual
practice of law, including examination of the effect of rules of professional
ethics and liability not only on the behavior but also on the feelings and mental
health of lawyers. Moreover, although law faculties understandably resist the
idea of courses or research projects in "law practice management," there is no
particularly persuasive reason why systematic inquiry into the nature of group
work in the legal profession should not become part of the academic agenda.
As for the development of an ethic of lawyers caring for other lawyers, there
is, of course, every reason to hope that attitudes and habits that would form
9 See generally, At the Breaking Point, supra note 3, at 14.
10Lawrence J. Fox, 1995-96 Chair of the American Bar Association Section of
Litigation, articulated this idea very eloquently in an unpublished talk to the Class of
1996 of the Dickinson School of Law at the School's Second Annual Senior Speakers
Dinner in April 1996. See also, Lawrence J. Fox, Money Didn't Buy Happiness, 100 DICK.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996). The simple but very powerful idea that lawyers have a
responsibility to take care of one another on an individual, day-to-day basis is by no
means obvious in the context of contemporary law practice.
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the operative basis for such an ethic can be modeled, taught and reinforced in
the law schools.
Attention must be given to the impact of legal education on law students.
The Beck study and its precursors tell us in language of the social scientists
what law teachers know but often choose to avoid: some law students report
significant distress in law school. It is likely that some of this personal distress
both interferes with learning and results in habits of thought and in behaviors
that are not conducive to successful and happy professional careers.
There is a useful body of literature suggesting some concrete ways which
law faculties and law school administrations might ameliorate some law
student stress. Two of the best articles on the subject were published in 1991
and 1992, one by Professor B.A. Glesner,1 and another by my colleague Peter
Kutulakis.12 Each of these articles provides prescriptions for the reduction of
law student stress that are of considerable potential utility. I do not choose here,
however, to reiterate the Glesner and Kutulakis theses. Instead, I offer
observations on characteristics of law schools in the 1990s that, in my judgment,
make it difficult for law schools to respond effectively to the message of the
Beck study.
Part of the larger problem of lawyer distress begins even before a student
has his or her first taste of the now greatly diluted Socratic method: some men
and women drift into law school by default. Many of these students have no
informed interest in practicing law. Some of these students are ill-suited by
temperament, personality or even intellect to effectively practice law.
American law schools as a group are not as selective as we might think. In
recent years, approximately fifty percent of the nationwide law school
applicant pool has been admitted to at least one law school. There is no
consensus on a required pre-law curriculum that would cause college students
to carefully consider whether they are suited for legal education. Although
some law schools engage in what they describe as a multi-factor admissions
analysis, taking into account such things as leadership ability, co-curricular
activities, employment history and so forth, I suggest that most law school
admissions decisions in most of our law schools are primarily responses to
LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages. Thus, for college
graduates who are reasonably verbally skilled, law school is a relatively
accessible and socially respectable post-graduate activity that is attractive to
those who reach their senior year in college without another clear career choice
11B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 627 (1991).
12Peter Kutulakis, Stress and Competence: From Law Student to Professional, 21 CAP.
U.L. REv. 835 (1992).
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and who want to extend their time in the environment of a school, an
environment in which they have been comfortable and reasonably successful. 13
While law schools always have welcomed students who enter law school
with the intention to use their legal education in a career other then a traditional
law practice, this is not the phenomenon I now describe. I mean to describe a
different group of students who come to law school having given little or no
prior thought to a career in law or otherwise, with little or no effective pre-law
advising, and with little or no psychological, emotional or intellectual
commitment to the enterprise. My point here is that as we measure personal
distress among law students we should observe that it is likely that in every
law school student body there is a significant minority of students for whom
professional aspirations and professional ideals are secondary to the simple
desire to extend the further process of maturation in the familiar and socially
respectable environment of school. Ihypothesize that levels of personal distress
in law school might be higher among this minority of law students than among
law school populations as a whole. I offer no proof of this beyond the statement
of my own intuitive judgment. Moreover, I disclaim any intention to engage in
"blame-the-victim" thinking. Instead I suggest that if my hypothesis is sound,
the law schools--and the bar-might effectively reduce some of the incidence
of law student distress by engaging in a systematic effort to improve both the
quantity and quality of information provided to potential law students about
the nature and demands of law school and about the various careers for which
legal education is essential or useful.
Although much is being done in the law schools to provide law students with
information about legal education and about the profession-all of which
efforts are useful and should be multiplied and expanded- my point is that if
law schools were to make even more "consumer disclosures" and if law schools
were to even better educate potential law students about the profession, some
people who would be quite unhappy in law school would be enabled to make
more informed choices and would not simply drift into law school.
Simultaneously, other people would choose law school on the basis of better
information and thus would begin the process of life-long education with a
greater sense of confidence and commitment.
A second factor which is a reason for law student distress (and for which
remedies are not readily at hand) is the high cost of legal education. High
tuition charges translate into student debt burdens that are disproportionately
related to the likely economic rewards of law practice for most graduates in the
first decade or so of law practice. Many law students graduate from law school
with more than $40,000 in law-school related debt. Some come to law school
with an additional $30,000 to $40,000 in undergraduate debt. The opportunities
to borrow for both law school tuition and living expenses are almost irresistible.
But burdened with loan payments of as much as $500 per month for ten years
13Professor Mary Ann Glendon suggests that one of the impacts of such students on
law schools is that law teachers have diluted their courses to satisfy these uncommitted
students. MARY ANN GLENDON, A Nation Under Lawyers 199-203 (1994).
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following graduation, some law students are unable to comfortably take lower
paying but greatly satisfying jobs in the public sector. And others almost
certainly recognize, mid-way through their law school careers, that the real
earning capacity of most young lawyers is not sufficient to comfortably sup port
large loan payments. Such students understandably might be demoralized and
discouraged.
This is a problem to which there is no easy solution, particularly in the
current environment in which too many law schools are literally chasing a
declining pool of applicants. There are real economic effects associated with
decisions by individual law schools to reduce enrollment. Smaller student
bodies mean that fixed costs are spread over fewer students. Increased costs
per student usually mean higher tuition charges. Short of engaging in
successful efforts to obtain considerably more private and public support, and
short of considerable reduction in faculty size, faculty compensation, or
student services to reduce the cost push on tuition, it is difficult to see how law
schools can effectively respond to the high debt load problem except, of course,
by taking advantage of the economies of scale and enrolling truly marginal
students simply to secure their tuition revenue.
Much of what law schools might do to alleviate law student distress and to
better prepare students to cope with the demands of practice, must be done, if
at all, by the law faculties, with support from law school administrations. 14
There are reasons to wonder, however, whether in the current environment of
legal education even the best-intentioned law faculties can be very effective in
this regard. In the culture of legal education the most pejorative phrase used
to describe a law school is the phrase "trade school." In an age of high circulation
journalism reporting "rankings" designed only to sell magazines, but which,
nonetheless, become part of the currency of the profession, law schools with
an internal culture in which teaching and attention to student needs are valued
more than scholarship are at risk of falling down the reputational ladder.
Respect and high regard are more readily given to law schools in which faculty
scholarship (often of a highly theoretical nature) is valued more highly than
attention to teaching or to students.
It is not, I think, much of an exaggeration to suggest that many law schools
are faced with serious dilemmas as they define their missions and cultures
because law faculties and deans receive very mixed messages from the media,
applicants, college pre-law advisors, and the accrediting agencies. On one
hand, they are told that respect and reputation are positively correlated with a
high level of faculty scholarship, and, on the other hand, they are told that their
first obligation is to educate professionally responsible lawyers. Moreover most
law school deans and faculties know, at least privately, that for many-perhaps
most-law teachers the greatest professional satisfaction is derived from
effective and caring teaching. There are, unfortunately, only twenty-four hours
in a day. It is difficult, if not impossible, for even the most concerned law teacher
14 See sources cited supra notes 11 & 12.
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to respond to all of these messages. What priorities should be established?
What balance should be maintained between scholarship, which is certainly a
necessary predicate for good teaching, and the process of teaching and advising
students which is at the core of the enterprise?
I am convinced, on the basis of experience as a teacher at five law schools,
that it is possible to establish a law school culture in which the administration
and faculty can work effectively to substantially reduce the level of
unnecessary law student distress. I believe, however, that accomplishing this
on any large scale among the law schools generally might require not only
implementation of many of the suggestions of Professors Glesner and
Kutulakis, but also that we abandon the ideas that all law schools should be
fundamentally similar, built on the model of a large-enrollment major research
center, and that all law schools should therefore be "ranked" on a single,
universal scale.15 Only then, I think, might our law schools truly be free to
define their own missions with self-confidence. I am optimistic that if armed
with that self-confidence, many law schools could and would operate in a
manner that would reduce their student's distress, enhance their students'
coping mechanisms, and better prepare their students for effective, healthy and
happy careers in the demanding, but ultimately very satisfying work of helping
people as well-educated lawyers.
Our law schools have paid a great deal of attention to study of the law. It is
time that our law schools add to their agendas a more systematic study of
lawyers and of the practice of law. It is time that we heed the messages warning
us to pay more attention to the personal needs of law students and lawyers.
15My colleague Laurel Terry suggests in a forthcoming essay that we should, if
possible, establish an understanding that law schools choosing to serve as professional
schools, with an emphasis on teaching, rather than serving as research-oriented
graduate schools, should be evaluated and "ranked" among themselves. Laurel Terry,
Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further: In Celebration of"Professional Schools", 100
DICK. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).

